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Abstract
Leading up to the 2014 Farm Bill, the House of Representatives and the Senate proposed alternative changes to
the incentive structure for farmer conservation efforts. While both include crop insurance subsidies, the version
proposed by the Senate made such subsidies conditional on conservation efforts. This study uses experimental
methods to analyze the efficacy of these two alternative designs in comparison to the previous, 2008 Farm Bill,
design and investigates in how far additional nudging for empathy can improve on the efficiency. The results
support the contention that solely offering financial incentives, as is the case in the 2014 Farm Bill, leads to
crowding-out of intrinsic motivations and hence may be counterproductive. Similarly, nudging for empathy by
itself is relatively ineffective. Nudging in conjunction with financial incentives, however, has a statistically and
economically significant and positive impact on conservation behavior and may therefore offer a relatively cheap
way to improve the efficiency of conservation-related legislative efforts.
Keywords: agricultural policy, conservation policy, empathy, firm behavior, metaeconomics framework
1. Introduction
Current and past farm practices frequently lead and have led to significant environmental degradation in the form
of, among others, soil erosion (Note 1) as well as fertilizer and chemical-related water pollution. The United
States Department of Agriculture, in consort with the Environmental Protection Agency, has long tried to
implement policies to limit the negative effects on the environment. Leading up to the passage of the
Agricultural Act of 2014 (H.R. 2642; Pub.L. 113–79,2014; also known, and henceforth referred to, as the 2014
Farm Bill) a lot of the discussion in the Senate and the House of Representatives revolved around how to change
farm policies and programs, including the conservation programs, from the 2008 Farm Bill to make them more
efficient. Based on estimates by the Congressional Budget Office a continuation of the 2008 Farm Bill policies
would have cost almost $1 trillion (Note 2) during the course of the next 10 years. The proposals of the Senate
and the House of Representatives for the 2014 Farm Bill both entailed significant spending cuts, including
removing direct payments to farmers. In the 2008 Farm Bill these direct payments were conditional on
conservation compliance. Other parts of the proposals consolidated the number of conservation programs and
reduced mandatory funding. The 2008 Farm Bill also provided substantive subsidies to a crop insurance program
administered by the Risk Management Agency, which historically have not been connected to conservation
compliance. One key difference between the two proposals by the Senate and the House of Representatives was
in the proposed changes as related to conservation compliance, which gives the focus to this study. Both
proposals continued to offer crop insurance subsidies, but the version proposed by the Senate, and eventually
adopted in the 2014 Farm Bill, made this subsidy conditional on conservation compliance whereas the version
proposed by the House of Representatives provided this subsidy without compliance. Such a difference in the
incentive structure can potentially result in substantially different levels of conservation effort by farmers. The
key differences in terms of incentive structure are highlighted in Table 1.
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Table 1. Differences in incentive structures
Policy

Direct Payment

Crop Insurance Subsidy

2008 Farm Bill

Conditional

Unconditional

House Bill

N/A

Unconditional

Senate Bill

N/A

Conditional

Since the crop insurance subsidy is highly valued (virtually all farmers buy crop insurance) and conservation
compliance is costly for farmers, the conditional subsidy put into law in the 2014 Farm Bill should be expected,
assuming profit maximizing rational individuals, to lead to much higher levels of conservation compliance than
if the policy had been modelled after the House version.
Ex-ante it is, nonetheless, unclear which policy design is the most effective. As stressed by Willock et al. (1999),
standard economic models that assume profit maximizing-only behavior are ill-suited for predicting behavior in
an environmental protection context. Willock et al. (1999) provide evidence that in addition other factors,
suggested by economic psychology, going beyond and transcending the usual exclusive focus on self-interest fed
by financial incentives, should be taken into consideration. Therefore, even a policy without any financial
incentives for the farmers to achieve conservation compliance (such as the bill proposed by the House of
Representatives), will not necessarily result in less environmentally friendly and socially responsible behavior
(see also Frey & Jegen, 2001; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b). Our key
objective in this project is, hence, to use experimental methods to compare the effectiveness of the two proposed
policy designs leading up to the current 2014 Farm Bill and three modified versions, and provide policy
guidelines on what modifications to consider for future farm bills.
The paper proceeds with a brief discussion of the relevant literature, the research questions to be tested in this
study, followed by a description of the experimental design and procedures, and a report of the experimental
results. The last section of the paper discusses the findings and draws policy implications.
2. Relevant Literature
The traditional economics perspective favors incentives as the most effective tool in achieving environmental
objectives, even though providing an incentive of sufficient size to actually nudge behavior could be very costly.
The argument, originally presented in work by Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1972) and Stigler (1970), suggests
individuals will rationally weigh the benefits and costs of compliance with regulations to decide on the optimal
behavior. In addition to the degree, type, and rigorousness of enforcement, financial incentives, in this
perspective, are believed to be the most significant determinants of conservation choices. Empirically there is
mixed evidence for the efficacy of enforcement, with some studies (e.g. Burby & Paterson, 1993; Winter & May,
2001) confirming a significant, and positive (albeit some only for detection) effect, some studies finding no
effect (e.g. Braithweite & Makkai, 1991), and others providing inconsistent conclusions (e.g. Kuperan & Sutinen,
1998). This leaves, according to this viewpoint, financial incentives as the main tool for policy makers to affect
behavior. Therefore, in the context of the current and past Farm Bills, an incentive structure with conditional
payments, such as the 2008 Farm Bill and the Senate Bill/2014 Farm Bill, would have to be considered more
effective than one based on unconditional payments, such as the House Bill, to achieve the conservation
compliance objective. (Note 3)
Empirically, there is some evidence to support the contention that incentivized policy designs are more effective
than completely voluntary schemes (Jaraitė & Kažukauskas, 2012). However, financial incentives are not
unambiguously positive in stimulating desired behavior, and may in fact be counterproductive. Frey and Jegen
(2001) call this the crowding out effect – intrinsic motivation to protect the environment or support fellow
citizens may be crowded out by extrinsic pecuniary motivation (see also Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy
& Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b). This suggests that different parts of the brain may be at work when making
decisions that are based on pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivations. Indeed, neuroscience demonstrates that
pecuniary rewards activate the pleasure center in the brain, the nucleus accumbens (Knutson, Adams, Fong &
Hommer, 2001), whereas altruistic (which generally represent a kind of sacrifice as related to an internalized,
shared interest) actions mostly work in the “social center” of the brain, the posterior superior temporal sulcus
(Tankersly, Stowe & Huettel, 2007). In the context of this paper this implies that perhaps an incentive structure
with only unconditional payments/subsidies, as proposed by the House, is in fact superior in achieving overall
increased efficiency.
24
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Even more, the role of empathy should perhaps be explicitly considered in policy making. Berenguer (2007)
found that participants who revealed a higher empathy level towards a bird or a tree displayed stronger
environmental attitudes and behavior. Shelton and Rogers (1981) showed that empathy-arousing (via role-taking
instructions) appeals increase intentions to help. Similarly, Schultz (2000) reported that participants who were
instructed to take the perspective (e.g. nudged for empathy) of an animal harmed by pollution score higher on the
biospheric environmental concern scale.
In contrast to other theoretical frameworks, the metaeconomics framework (Hayes & Lynne, 2004, 2013; Lynne,
2002, 2006; Sheeder & Lynne, 2011) accounts not only for profit, social, and normative considerations, but also
for the neurological evidence of different parts of the brain being responsible for decision making in pecuniary
versus non-pecuniary situations, by modeling the decision making process as stemming from two interdependent,
joint interests that need to be internally balanced. The dual interest theory, which gives the analytical machinery
for the framework, posits that human behavior is not driven by egoistic-hedonistic self-interest only, but is also
influenced by an empathy-sympathy based other-interest. Specifically for the context of this paper, the model
predicts that a well-designed policy has to consider the dual nature of the interests, and hence neither appeal only
to self-interest, nor only to the shared other-interest but rather to a joint, interdependent and nonseparable
expression of both interests. Various papers have empirically tested dual interest theory and the dual motive
(empirical) model it suggests, and have found substantive supporting evidence for its validity (see for example
Bishop, Shumway & Wandschneider, 2010; Chouinard, Paterson, Wandschneider & Ohler, 2008; Kalinowski,
Lynne & Johnson, 2006; Ovchinnikova, Czap, H., Lynne & Larimer, 2009; Sautter, Czap, N., Kruse & Lynne,
2011; Czap, N., Czap, H., Khachaturyan, Lynne & Burbach, 2012).
3. Research Questions
Based on the metaeconomic framework and the findings by Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee
(1997), and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) it is unclear what kind of incentive structure leads to the best
outcome in terms of conservation behavior. Leading up to the passage of the 2014 Farm Bill two different
changes to the 2008 Farm Bill were proposed and it stands to reason that further revisions will happen in future
farm bills. As such it is important from both a theoretical but also practical policy application perspective to
determine the impact of changes in the incentive structure and derive guidelines on how to optimize policy in the
future.
Specifically, we want to test herein whether (a) the 2008 Farm Bill design, the incentive structure based on the
Senate proposal (which was adopted in the 2014 Farm Bill) or the House version demonstrates superior
performance, (b) nudging for empathy has a significant impact on conservation behavior, and (c), following the
meteconomic theory, the combination of pecuniary incentives and empathy nudging is superior to either one
incentive/nudge individually. For assessment/ranking we define superior based on four potential objectives of
public policy (Table 2).
Table 2. Policy objectives
Level of conservation/ Degree of conservation
compliance
1.

Highest level of average conservation

2.

Highest frequency of over-compliance

3.

Lowest share of zero conservation

Distribution of social gains
4. Largest proportion choosing an equal distribution of
profits

Traditional economics typically assumes a representative agent, and thus homogeneity of characteristics. As a
consequence most economic analyses focus on the average (i.e. objective 1 in Table 2). Instead, we consider
heterogeneity of economic agents (for a modelling approach see for example Giannakas and Kaplan (2005)) in
their degree of empathy (Note 4). This allows analyzing the distribution or share (i.e. objectives 2-4 in Table 2),
and hence provides additional policy relevant information.
4. Experimental Design and Procedures
In this paper we consider the upstream-downstream pollution problem in which an upstream farmer chooses the
level of conservation on their land, which affects the extent of soil erosion and chemical runoff into a river,
which, in turn, affects the pollution level of the downstream lake that is utilized by a downstream water user. In
25
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terms of experimental economics, the conservation choice of upstream farmers and its impact on downstream
water users bears, at least from an individual farmer’s perspective, similarities to a dictator game. It is realistic to
assume that each farmer considers ownself too small to affect policy making through own behavior. Since
externalities are, by definition, not priced into the product, the farmer has no price signal that would point to a
socially optimal behavior, with the individual farmer in effect in a monopolistic position concerning conservation
choices. The solution, based on traditional economics, is to design public policy that provides financial
incentives to achieve market based self-regulation, and, if this fails (due to the high costs of such policies,
especially relative to the capacity for payment from limited tax dollars), then the frame turns to coercive,
mandatory regulations and direct control of farmer choices. As discussed before, findings in
experimental/behavioral economics and economic psychology hint at empathy as a driving force of human
behavior and thus support supplementing or, perhaps, substituting these traditional approaches by nudging
individuals towards walking-in-the-shoes-of-others.
4.1 Baseline Upstream-Downstream Pollution Game
To analyze the effectiveness of the various proposed policy designs in the aforementioned context of an
upstream-downstream water pollution problem we used a framed laboratory experiment. There were two players
in the game. One of the players took on the role of Upstream Farmer (UF) deciding on the level (in number of
acres [0-500]) of Conservation Technology (CT) to be used on their land. Compared to intensive tillage, doing
conservation tillage (i.e. using conservation technology) means that the land is disturbed minimally leading to
less soil erosion, lower chemical runoff and overall higher drinking water quality of the downstream rivers and
lakes and thus is a relatively less harmful agricultural practice. However, CT is more costly for the farmer, as
represented in things like the increased uncertainty of planting dates due to more residues being left on the field.
The other player represents a user of drinking water living downstream, henceforth called Downstream Water
User (DWU), who is affected by the consequences of the decision by the Upstream Farmer.
The setup of the baseline version of the game (referred to as 2008 Policy) is based on a standard dictator game
(Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986). A decision by the UF (dictator) to put land under CT increases the net
profit of the DWU (recipient) and decreases the net profit of the UF. The game was played in context, meaning
that the situation resembles the policy for agricultural conservation practices under the 2008 Farm Bill. The UF
got a crop insurance subsidy (CIS) to offset part of the crop insurance premium and a direct payment (DP) that
was conditional to the conservation compliance (in our case the level of CT had to be equal to or greater than the
conservation compliance level of CT, referred to as
). The conditional direct payment provided a financial
incentive for the UF to engage in socially desirable/environmentally-friendly behavior. To reflect the fact that
public money is used to pay subsidies and direct payments, part of the direct payment was paid from the profit of
DWU. The profit function for the UF in the baseline treatment was hence given as:
=

−2∗
+
+

=

,
+

(1)
<
≥

,

(2)

while the profit function of DWU was:
=

+2∗
− ∗

=

− ∗

(3)

,

<
− ∗

,

≥

(4)

The respective values for the parameters used in the experiment are given in Table 3. The Nash equilibrium for
the UF was to choose a zero level of conservation technology. In this sense the decision of the UF to use
non-zero levels of conservation technology is similar to altruistic giving in a dictator game.
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Table 3. Parameter values for profit functions
Parameter

Level
1500 tokens
500 tokens

CT

chosen by UF: 0-500 acres

CTCC

250 acres

CIS

200 tokens

DP

100 tokens

newCIS

300 tokens

It is worthwhile noting that the game is a zero sum game: the payoffs of UF and DWU always add up to the
same amount. This was done to ensure that maximizing joint payoffs for UF and DWU was not part of the
choice set. Deciding on CT of 250 represents an even split between environmentally friendly farming and a more
traditional/profit oriented farming choice. A choice of CT of 350 acres was the egalitarian outcome in which UF
and DWU obtain the exact same payoff.
4.2 Experimental Treatments
We designed four treatments resembling four possible public policies. Treatment 1 (referred to as House version)
had an incentive structure based on the House of Representatives Farm Bill proposal. As noted, in this version
the direct payments are eliminated, but the farmers could still receive a CIS. We increased CIS to newCIS in
order to make the treatments comparable, i.e. avoid a possible income effect of the eliminated DP. The crop
insurance subsidy was now independent of conservation compliance. This means that the farmers did not see a
financial link between the subsidies and their conservation compliance. The net profits were:
=

+
=

(5)

− ∗

(6)

Treatment 2 (referred to as Senate version) was based on the Senate’s proposal, which was mostly adopted in the
2014 Farm Bill. As noted, in this version the direct payments were also eliminated. However, newCIS was
conditional on conservation compliance. The net profit was:
,
+

=

<
≥

,

,

=

<
− ∗

,

≥

(7)
(8)

Treatments 3 & 4 (referred to as Senate + Nudging version and House + Nudging version respectively)
combined the features of treatments 1 & 2 with empathy nudging. The net profits in treatments 3 & 4 were the
same as in the corresponding treatments 1 & 2. The difference was that in these treatments the DWU could send
a message to the UF nudging for empathy/walking-in-the-shoes-of-other before the UF made a decision about
conservation.
The messages were based on the perspective taking and fantasy subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(Davis, 1980, 1983) which is a measure of dispositional empathy. The fantasy subscale contains seven statements
such as “I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me” and “I really get
involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel”. The perspective taking subscale contains seven
statements such as “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision” and “When I'm
upset at someone, I usually try to ’put myself in his shoes‘ for a while”. After determining the key elements from
each statement and eliminating overlap (for example we used only one of the two following questions: “look at
everybody’s side” and “look at both sides of the question”), we were left with 6 key phrases. We modified the
phrases into meaningful messages that the DWU could send to the UF, e.g. “Before choosing the level of CT this
round, please see your decision from my point of view”. We used two types of phrasing: more personal (e.g. my
point of view, my perspective, in my place) and more general (e.g. DWU’s point of view, DWU’s perspective, in
the DWU’s place). For a list of messages see Appendix A.
27
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4.3 Procedures and Subjects
The participants’ decisions were tracked throughout the experiment using a 5-digit random number to assure
anonymity. Prior to the actual experiment, the participants took a farming quiz. They were informed that their
performance on the quiz determined their role in the experiment and how much control they would have over
their cash earnings. This quiz contained questions testing participants’ knowledge of basic farming issues,
including agricultural practices, technologies, and public policies. This was done for two reasons: (a) many
farmers have worked their land for generations and thus feel that they have earned the right to farm the way they
want. Having earned the position through performing better at a quiz on farming instills a similar feeling, albeit
perhaps to a lesser degree, in the subjects; (b) Subjects with more knowledge of farming practices were more
likely to have some farming background and hence could more easily identify with the role of a farmer. Since the
experiment is in context, this is an important element. In each session the subjects were ranked by their quiz
performance with the speed of completion used to break ties. The top 50% of subjects in the session earned the
right to play the role of UF and the rest played as a DWU.
After the participants completed the quiz and received feedback on their performance (top 50% or bottom 50%),
they read the experimental instructions for Rounds 1-10 on the computer screen. A summary of the instructions
was also read aloud to ensure that participants knew that all subjects had the same set of instructions. In addition,
each subject received a handout containing the summary of instructions for Rounds 1-10 (see Appendix B) and a
table with possible payoffs for the UF as well as for the DWU. Before the experiment began, participants had to
answer correctly questions checking their understanding of the instructions and the calculation of the payoffs.
After the completion of Round 10, the participants read a new set of instructions, received a new summary of
instructions, and heard it being read aloud (Appendix C-F).
Participants played the game for 20 rounds in total in a “partner matching” design. For the first 10 rounds all
participants played the baseline game (2008 Farm Bill). For Rounds 11-20 participants were assigned to one of
the 4 treatments described above. The reason for doing such a sequential setup, with the baseline always first,
was to establish the 2008 Farm Bill as the status quo policy, just like in the real world.
In total, 400 subjects participated in the experiment: 100 in each treatment, resulting in 50 independent
observations per treatment. All subjects were recruited at the University of Nebraska – Lincoln and the
community at large (the majority were students, 50% females, of age 19 to 78, with an average age of 26.3
years). Thirty-seven percent of our participants grew up in a rural area and 71% indicated they have farmers in
their families. 97% of the subjects playing upstream farmers indicated in a “reality check” that they were
imagining themselves being farmers during the experiment.
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. All sessions were computerized and administered using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). Each session took up to 90 minutes. The tokens that the participants earned during the experiment (sum of
payoffs in 20 rounds) were converted into dollars ($1=500 tokens) and paid to the participants privately in cash,
with average earnings of $43.6. (Note 5)
5. Experimental Results
The next several figures illustrate the results for the various policy objectives that are considered in this paper.
Not surprisingly, and in line with typical findings in the dictator game literature, subjects did not on average
converge to the Nash equilibrium of maximizing own profits, but rather exhibited some type of sharing behavior
(Note 6). As apparent from Fig. 1, the average (Note 7) amount of conservation tillage chosen under the 2008
Farm Bill policy did not differ much from what was chosen in the Senate version or the House version of the
Bill.
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portion of Land
Prop
under CT
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
2008 Policcy

H
House

Senate

House + N
Nudging Sennate + Nudging
g

Fiigure 1. Averagge proportion of land under conservation ttechnology
Even thouugh the House version with added nudgingg did perform slightly betterr (Fig.1), this difference was not
statisticallyy significant. The
T Senate veersion with nuddging did signnificantly betteer (p-value < 00.01 for the Mann–
M
Whitney-W
Wilcoxon rankk sum test) thaan the Senate vversion withouut nudging. Thhe lack of stattistical signific
cance
between tthe Senate annd House verssion suggests that the finaancial incentivve simply compensates forr the
crowding-out effect that has been show
wn in Frey andd Jegen (2001)), Frey and Obberholzer-Gee ((1999) and Gn
neezy
and Rusticchini (2000a, 2000b).
2
To achhieve better ressults a policy hhas to not onlyy provide finanncial incentive
es but
also countteract the impaact of this crow
wding-out by, for example, opening comm
munication chaannels between the
decision m
maker and the affected
a
party to allow for em
mpathy nudginng. It is interessting that the H
House version does
not benefitt from this nuddging. This maay indicate thaat subjects alreaady are empathhetic due to thhe payment they are
receiving, a kind of reciiprocity. Tryinng to push them
m further to bbe empathetic w
will not be eff
ffective. Remin
nding
them of em
mpathy when there
t
is crowdiing out (i.e. whhen financial inncentives are pprovided), thouugh, is effectiv
ve.
Not surpriisingly, based on the previoous discussionn, the Senate version, with its financial incentives, pu
ushed
people to behave as proofit maximizers, i.e. choose zero CT (Fig.2). The differeence between the Senate version
and all othher policies waas large and staatistically highhly significant (p-value<.01). Again, as in tthe previous graph,
this was ccounteracted effectively
e
withh nudging. Thhe Senate + N
Nudging versioon had a statiistically signifficant
lower perccentage of proofit maximizerrs than the 20008 policy (p-vvalue<.01), thee House versioon without nud
dging
(p-value<.05), and the House
H
+ Nudginng version (p-vvalue<.05).
P
Proportion off UFs
0.3 cchoosing zeroo CT
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
2008 Pollicy

H
House

Senate

House + N
Nudging Senaate + Nudging

Figuure 2. Profit m
maximization (C
CT=0 acres)
a
When it ccomes to goinng beyond thee incentive thrreshold of 2500 acres underr conservationn, the results again
underline the effectivenness of nudgess for increasinng CT (see Figg. 3). There w
was a substantiial and statistiically
significantt (p-values<.01) difference bbetween the fiirst three and the last two ppolicy designs (Fig.3). Generally,
the nudginng treatments performed
p
muuch better thann the alternativves discussed pprior to (and inncluding) the 2014
Farm Bill in terms of envvironmental prrotection.
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Perrcentage of UFss
with
h CT>250 acres

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
2008 Pollicy

H
House

Senate

House + N
Nudging Senaate + Nudging

Figgure 3. Going bbeyond: over-ccompliance
The nudgiing treatments did not only sshow superiorr performance in terms of inncreased conseervation effortss, but
also when it came to disstributional asppects (Fig. 4). The two nudgging treatmentss provided thee largest percen
ntage
of people ggoing for an evven split in proofits (p-value<
<.01).
Propoortion of Ufs
witth CT=350
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
2008 Policcy

H
House

Senate

Housee + Nudging

Senate + Nud
dging

Figure 4. B
Balance of proffits: equal proffits of UF and D
DWU
with the resullts presented on Fig. 3, this strongly suuggests that anny policy thaat aims to increase
Together w
income/weelfare equalityy should not resort to pecuniaary incentives only, but provvide venues foor empathy nud
dging
as well.
The abovee results were based on paiirwise comparrisons to estabblish statisticall significance. To obtain a more
complete ppicture of the impact of the respective pollicy designs w
we estimated a Tobit regressiion (Table 4) using
u
the 2008 ppolicy as the baaseline case.
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Table 4. Tobit Regression with CT as dependent variable – 2008 policy is the baseline case
Independent Variables

Coefficient

Intercept

184.42***

D_House (1=Yes)†

1.29

D_Senate (1=Yes) †

-9.98

D_House x D_Nudging (1=Yes) †

8.52

D_Senate x D_Nudging (1=Yes) †

60.64***

† - Dummies for each treatment
Significance level: *** - significant at the 1% level
Log-likelihood: -21639.6
NOTE: The dependent variable CT is truncated between 0 and 500 acres.
The estimation results of this regression confirmed the descriptive results presented in Fig. 1, with the
conservation effort under the Senate version with nudging statistically and economically significantly larger than
under the incentive structure based on the 2008 Farm Bill. The coefficient of 60.64 for the Senate version with
nudging represents a more than 30% increase in acres placed under conservation compared to the baseline case
of the 2008 Farm Bill. These results hold also when controlling for additional factors like gender, age, whether
the subjects thought the assignment of roles was fair, and whether the subjects playing the upstream farmer
actually imagined themselves in the positon of an upstream farmer.
6. Discussion and Policy Design
The results presented in this paper have important implications for effective policy making and program design.
We ranked the policy designs considered in this experiment according to their performance on the four policy
objectives (Table 5). The distributional rank was constructed based on the proportions of equal profits of UF and
DWU. The conservation ranking was derived by calculating the average rank of each policy design across the
three conservation objectives and ranking these average ranks.
Table 5. Ranking of policy designs
Policy

Overall Rank (“1” is the best)
Conservation

Distributional

2008 policy

3

4

House

4

5

Senate

5

3

House + Nudging

2

1

Senate + Nudging

1

2

If enforcement is cheap and effective, a command and control approach is a feasible policy. However, using
enforcement to reduce non-point pollution is not easy (and hence not cheap). Furthermore, U.S. farmers are
likely to resist a coercive, direct regulation in contrast to a policy based on voluntary participation, with a
predictable backlash, and perhaps even less conservation effort (e.g. Armstrong, Ling, Stedman & Kleinman,
2011). Hence, such enforcement could be a very costly policy, and we need to search for alternatives to ensure
the desired behavior. In the process of designing the 2014 Farm Bill, the House of Representatives and the
Senate proposed two such designs, with the former providing no financial incentive for conservation compliance
and the latter providing a financial reward conditional on compliance. In terms of overall conservation both
approaches turned out to be slightly, albeit statistically insignificantly, less effective than the 2008 Farm Bill
policy. In the experiment the non-incentivized policy was assumed to be at least as costly as the 2008 Farm Bill
policy and the incentivized policy, due to the conditionality of the subsidies in the latter two. Given that a larger
share of the subsidy is incentivized under the Senate version, this would have to be considered the most
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cost-effective way of encouraging conservation behavior by subjects. In summary, withholding subsidies for lack
of conservation compliance is not more effective in encouraging conservation compliance, but costs less money
and should therefore be considered the superior policy.
What is typically ignored in the current policy debate is the role of empathy. Current policies also assume a
representative farmer, who fits the mold of the homo economicus only frame. In reality, farmers are
heterogeneous in their degree of empathy, their ability to walk-in-the-shoes-of-others, and their preferences for
pecuniary gains. And, by no means, is the profit-maximizing individual the median characteristic. As predicted
by dual interest theory individuals are driven by both, egoistic-hedonistic self-interest as well as
empathy-sympathy based other(shared ethic)-interest. We find evidence for this in the observation that only the
combination of increased pecuniary incentives (appealing to the egoistic-hedonistic self-interest) AND nudging
for empathy (appealing to other(shared ethic)-interest) is effective in achieving more balanced decisions,
providing financial and environmental gains to upstream farmers as well as downstream water users. This more
balanced behavior is evident in both the share of people willing to engage in self-sacrifice as well as the average
magnitude of such. Interestingly, when the objective is an equal distribution of profits, financial incentives do not
matter. The policy design without financial incentives but with empathy nudging (i.e. the House version +
Nudging) fares slightly, but statistically insignificantly, better than the policy design with financial incentives
and empathy nudging (i.e. the Senate version + Nudging).
Theoretically, these results also offer an intriguing extension to the finding of crowding-out effects on intrinsic
motivations through extrinsic pecuniary incentives by Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997),
and Gneezy and Rustichini, (2000a, 2000b). In line with the aforementioned authors, we find evidence of
crowding-out if extrinsic pecuniary motivations are introduced. However, even a fairly weak extrinsic reminder
of these intrinsic motivations alleviates the problem of crowding-out and leads to strong positive effects. From a
more practical policy perspective this suggests that designing public policy for a shared, social good, such as the
environment, based on the assumption of a profit-maximizing representative economic agent is inefficient at best,
and possibly counterproductive if crowding-out of intrinsic motivations is significant. Opening communication
channels between affected parties and polluters/farmers (such as town hall meetings, agricultural extension
meetings, local newspapers, crop insurance enrollment literature/meetings, etc.), including written/verbal
reminders of the “shared we” (for example in the communication of new regulations to the farmer), and nudging
to walk-in-the-shoes-of-others (possibly through social media) are all cheap, easy tools to dramatically improve
the efficiency of public policy.
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Note 1. According to the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) in 2007 alone there was soil erosion
of about 1.7 billion tons
Note 2. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate (July 26, 2012), H.R. 6083, Federal Agriculture Reform and
Risk Management Act of 2012
Note 3. Providing increased insurance subsidies may, however, lead to increased risk taking, increased acreage,
and other environmentally suboptimal decisions (see Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal (2004) and Walters,
Shumway, Chouinard and Wandschneider (2012) for a discussion). This is not further considered in this paper,
but needs to be part of the overall evaluation of the proposed/implemented policies.
Note 4. We are not claiming that there is homogeneity in producer skills, but for the purpose of our study it is
more relevant to focus solely on empathy as a differentiating criterion.
Note 5. This roughly corresponds to the incentive payments in recent experiments (e.g. Cubitt, Drouvelis &
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Note 6. It is difficult to compare the degree of sharing in this experiment to previous dictator games, because the
context and design of this experiment differs substantially. This is of secondary importance for the purpose of
this paper, because we are mainly interested in the relative performance of the policy designs.
Note 7. Across rounds and individuals
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Appendix
A.

List of Messages in Empathy nudging treatments

Personal message

General message

Before choosing the level of CT this year, please...
... see your decision from my point of view

... see your decision from the DWU's point of view

... understand my situation better by imagining how
your decision looks from my perspective

... understand the DWU's situation better by imagining
how your decision looks from the DWU's perspective

... look at both your and my side

... look at both your and the DWU's side

... put yourself in my place

... put yourself in the DWU's place

... try to put yourself in my shoes for a while

... try to put yourself in the DWU's shoes for a while

... imagine how you would feel in my place

... imagine how you would feel in the DWU's place

Appendices B-F. Summary of instructions given to the participants
B. Baseline (2008 Farm Bill), rounds 1-10 [distributed to all players]
Basics:
•

The game will be played for 20 rounds with the same person

•

Your earnings will consist of the sum of your net profit in 20 rounds

•

The exchange rate is $1=500 tokens

•

Your cash earnings will be paid to you privately

•

Your decisions are confidential and anonymous

•

Communication with other participants is not allowed

Stages of a round:
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage
Upstream Farmer decides how much of his/her 500 acres of farming land to place under Conservation Tillage
(CT). Various possible payoffs (in tokens) are presented in the table below.
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from
the table.
Crop
UF's profit
Direct
Level of
Insurance
from
Payment
CT, acres
Subsidy to
farming
to UF
UF

UF's
net
profit

DWU's
profit

Part of CIS Part of DP
DWU's
paid
by paid
by
net profit
DWU
DWU

0

1500

200

0

1700

500

67

0

433

50

1400

200

0

1600

600

67

0

533

100

1300

200

0

1500

700

67

0

633

150

1200

200

0

1400

800

67

0

733

200

1100

200

0

1300

900

67

0

833

250

1000

200

100

1300

1000

67

33

900

300

900

200

100

1200

1100

67

33

1000

350

800

200

100

1100

1200

67

33

1100

400

700

200

100

1000

1300

67

33

1200

450

600

200

100

900

1400

67

33

1300

500

500

200

100

800

1500

67

33

1400
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Stage 2: Information about profit:
Downstream Water User and Upstream Farmer will be given information about:
(1) Level of Conservation Tillage chosen by Upstream Farmer
(2) Net profits of UF and DWU
C. Treatment 1 (House version, i.e. Non-incentivized Conservation Compliance), rounds 11-20 [distributed
only to the players in the respective treatment]
Stages of a round:
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage
Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT
are presented in the table below.
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from
the table.
Level
of
CT, acres

UF's
profit
from farming

Crop Insurance
Subsidy to UF

UF's
profit

0

1500

300

50

1400

100

net

DWU's
profit

Part of CIS
paid by DWU

DWU's net
profit

1800

500

100

400

300

1700

600

100

500

1300

300

1600

700

100

600

150

1200

300

1500

800

100

700

200

1100

300

1400

900

100

800

250

1000

300

1300

1000

100

900

300

900

300

1200

1100

100

1000

350

800

300

1100

1200

100

1100

400

700

300

1000

1300

100

1200

450

600

300

900

1400

100

1300

500

500

300

800

1500

100

1400

Stage 2: Information about profit:
Same as in rounds 1-10.
D. Treatment 2 (Senate version, i.e. Incentivized Conservation Compliance), rounds 11-20 [distributed only
to the players in the respective treatment]
Stages of a round:
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage
Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT
are presented in the table below.
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from
the table.
Level
of
CT, acres

UF's
profit
from farming

Crop Insurance
Subsidy to UF

UF's
profit

0

1500

0

50

1400

100

1300

DWU's
profit

Part of CIS
paid by DWU

DWU's net
profit

1500

500

0

500

0

1400

600

0

600

0

1300

700

0

700
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150

1200

0

1200

800

0

800

200

1100

0

1100

900

0

900

250

1000

300

1300

1000

100

900

300

900

300

1200

1100

100

1000

350

800

300

1100

1200

100

1100

400

700

300

1000

1300

100

1200

450

600

300

900

1400

100

1300

500

500

300

800

1500

100

1400

Stage 2: Information about profit:
Same as in rounds 1-10.
E. Treatment 3 (House version & Empathy Nudging), rounds 11-20 [distributed only to the players in the
respective treatment]
Stages of a round:
Stage 0: Downstream Water User's message to Upstream Farmer
Before Upstream Farmer makes a decision, Downstream Water User can send Upstream Farmer a message.
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage
Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT
are presented in the table below.
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from
the table.
Level
of
CT, acres

UF's
profit
from farming

Crop Insurance
Subsidy to UF

UF's
profit

0

1500

300

50

1400

100

net

DWU's
profit

Part of CIS
paid by DWU

DWU's net
profit

1800

500

100

400

300

1700

600

100

500

1300

300

1600

700

100

600

150

1200

300

1500

800

100

700

200

1100

300

1400

900

100

800

250

1000

300

1300

1000

100

900

300

900

300

1200

1100

100

1000

350

800

300

1100

1200

100

1100

400

700

300

1000

1300

100

1200

450

600

300

900

1400

100

1300

500

500

300

800

1500

100

1400

Stage 2: Information about profit:
Same as in rounds 1-10.
F. Treatment 4 (Senate version & Empathy Nudging), rounds 11-20 [distributed only to the players in the
respective treatment]
Stages of a round:
Stage 0: Downstream Water User's message to Upstream Farmer
Before Upstream Farmer makes a decision, Downstream Water User can send Upstream Farmer a message.
Stage 1: Upstream Farmer’s decision on Conservation Tillage
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Same as in rounds 1-10, Upstream Farmer decides on CT. The new payoffs (in tokens) for various choices of CT
are presented in the table below.
NOTE: UF can choose any amount of acres between 0 and 500, it does not have to be a number from
the table.
Level
of
CT, acres

UF's
profit
from farming

Crop Insurance
Subsidy to UF

UF's
profit

0

1500

0

50

1400

100

net

DWU's
profit

Part of CIS
paid by DWU

DWU's net
profit

1500

500

0

500

0

1400

600

0

600

1300

0

1300

700

0

700

150

1200

0

1200

800

0

800

200

1100

0

1100

900

0

900

250

1000

300

1300

1000

100

900

300

900

300

1200

1100

100

1000

350

800

300

1100

1200

100

1100

400

700

300

1000

1300

100

1200

450

600

300

900

1400

100

1300

500

500

300

800

1500

100

1400

Stage 2: Information about profit:
Same as in rounds 1-10.
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